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Renewing the Community?  Pork Barrelling?  Maintaining the Status Quo? 
What’s the Agenda? 
 
K. Lavon Wright 
 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina there are thousands of businesses in the City of 
New Orleans closed.  In an attempt to diminish financial loss, retain local 
businesses, and attract investment the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development 
initiated the process of amending HUD guidelines to fit the city’s current economic 
status, and expand the existing Renewal Community boundaries to include the 
entire city.  Simultaneously, the state legislature in collaboration with the U.S. 
Congress worked towards a more inclusive incentive package, the Gulf Opportunity 
Zone.  Analysis found in this paper gives increased evidence of communication 
bottlenecks in federal government, and how decision making principles during a 
time of crisis are unfortunately overlooked.  Those most in need and with the most 
time constraints and fewest resources become underrepresented.  Pork barrelling 
occurs, possibly “renewing communities not in need” or simply maintaining the 
status quo.  
 
 
Shifting Local Agenda 
 
 
Pre-Katrina Social & Economic Climate 
  Whether rightfully labeled or wrongfully misjudged, both New Orleans and the 
State of Louisiana are nationally viewed through the framework of the locality's heavily 
malfeasant past.  It could be argued that this perception has caused a decrease in private 
investment and congressional influence which would aid the city in diminishing its 
economic and social challenges.   
 With disregard to improved academic score reports in schools performing below 
the state average due in part to superintendent-mandated changes in curriculum 
instruction, the recently elected Superintendent Anthony Amato was asked by Orleans 
Parish School Board to resign.  It was said that “He failed to recognize the size and scope 
of the system’s financial mess” (Gambit Weekly 2005). The improvement in test scores 
must have been less important.  Under scrutiny from the public and “themselves,” the 
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School Board continued to flounder in stabilizing the school system’s finances after the 
superintendent’s resignation and eventually lawmakers began calling for a state takeover 
of the local special government once again (Gambit Weekly 2005). 
 Elected official misconduct and ineffective bureaucratic political initiatives are 
widespread nationally and are not limited to Louisiana.  Neither the local government nor 
the state can be singled out for more federal investigations than several other states.  
There have been consistent state probes into suspected political corruption in Chicago.  
The latest being Mayor Richard M. Daley’s former patronage chief accused of ordering 
the shredding of files and deleting of computer data, so as to keep it out of the hands of 
federal investigators (Gambit Weekly 2005).  San Diego’s acting Mayor Michael Zucchet 
and Councilman Ralph Inzunza were both convicted on charges of wire fraud, 
conspiracy, and extortion in July of 2005, and there are several other investigations into 
civic contracts and affairs taking place nationally (Gambit Weekly 2005).  However, it 
should be acknowledged that within every stereotype is a sliver of truth.  Both New 
Orleans and Louisiana have a somewhat notorious reputation.    
 New Orleans was inundated with a stream of federal investigations in 2005 alone.  
Federal agents raided the home of Jacques Morial in the French Quarter, brother of 
former Mayor Marc Morial, and charged three individuals of stealing hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from an $81 million city energy management contract signed by the 
former mayor.  Another associate of former Mayor Morial, Glenn Haydel, was charged in 
August 2005 for wire fraud and money laundering with the Regional Transit Authority.  
Shortly following Hurricane Katrina in October, Police Chief Eddie Compass resigned 
after having four police officers cited for stealing 200 vehicles, 40 of which happened to 
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be cadillacs, further decreasing regional and national sympathy and increasing cynicism 
(Gambit Weekly 2005).    
 Before Hurricane Katrina and the displacing of the city’s 450,000 plus residents 
with land space only measuring 181 square miles making the city the 31st largest city in 
the country and the largest city in the state, New Orleans threatened to come in second 
with the nation’s second worst homicide rate, most likely to end the year with a tally of 
300 plus murders (Gambit Weekly 2005).  Studies show that high crime rates are directly 
linked to high unemployment and concentrated poverty.  With 34.6% of households in 
New Orleans occupying the bottom tier of the national income distribution and an 18% 
poverty rate, the city was identified by the Brookings Institution as the sixth poorest city 
of the top one hundred largest cities in 1999.  The median household income in New 
Orleans was one of the lowest, $35,317 in year 2000, placing the city 96th out of the one 
hundred largest metropolitan areas (Berube and Tiffany 2004).   
 The Brookings Institute has six categories with similar measurements for 
determining the degree to which income levels are equally distributed throughout a city 
and mirror national income distribution.  These categories are: balanced, divided, middle-
class, higher-end, low-moderate, and stressed.  In 1999 New Orleans was classified 
“stressed,” having at a minimum twice as many households in the bottom two categories 
combined (lower-middle and middle-income) as in the top two categories combined 
(upper-middle and high-income).1  Between 1970 and 2000 total non-farm employment 
grew 87% nationally, however, only a staggering 54% in the New Orleans metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA).  In 1970, the city had more than 60% of the metro area’s total 
                                                          
1 Cities considered stressed are places struggling with larger problems that include the long-term transition 
away from a manufacturing dominated economy, extreme racial segregation, and migration out of the 
northern U.S. to southern and western states. 
 4
jobs, by 2000 that share had dropped to 42%.  The city saw only a small 3% loss of jobs, 
meanwhile employment in surrounding parishes grew phenomenally.  Neighboring 
Jefferson parish, directly across New Orleans’ parish line, added 166,000 jobs (a 157% 
gain), St. Tammany parish added 69,000 jobs (a 431% gain), and St. Charles parish 
added 14,000 jobs (a 148% gain) (Brookings Institute October 2005).  Conclusively, it 
can be denounced that even before the havoc of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was 
growing slowly and facing challenges commonly accompanied with low incomes and 
poverty (The Brookings Institution October 2005).               
Pre- and Post-Storm Priorities 
 The chart below provides the city’s federal agenda before the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.  The agenda is project specific and has a high emphasis on scaling up 
transportation and infrastructure.  What is of particular immediacy is securing the city 
from possible storm devastation, measured by the number of projects listed and the 
estimated cost of completion regarding flood control, climate changes, wastewater 
inflow, canal lock replacement, ecosystem restoration, and emergency response shelters.  
Projects directly pertinent to protecting the city were of the highest priority, somewhat 
equal to that of transportation projects.  Seven projects were initiated for transportation 
and storm protection, although the cost associated with transportation projects is higher, 
approximately $1 billion in comparison to the $88 million request in flood control.  This 
does not necessarily correlate with higher or lower priority (City of New Orleans 2006).  
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CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 
Federal Priorities FY 2006 (PRE-KATRINA) 
Appropriations:  Grants/Requests 
 
PROJECT  DESCRIPTION  
Airport Runway 10/28 (East/West) rehabilitation – No funding for this awarded in 05. 
Project almost completed anyway. 
Community Health 
Center Project 
Convert four existing child health clinics into family clinics to provide primary 
care. (Requesting look-alike status).  
 Authorized Pillsbury as a look alike Clinic 
RPC/RTA Airport 
to CBD Light Rail 
Multimodal Transportation Project. Construction cost est. $270M; $135M would 
be FTA New Start; would require 50/50 match; the Regional Transit Authority is 
requesting $5M from the state for FY 06.  
RPC Road Projects 1)  Carrollton Ave. (US 61 – US 90) 
 2) Holiday Dr. (Gen Meyer to DeGaulle) 
 3)  Downman Rd. (Hayne to I 10) 
RTA/Desire 
Streetcar Line  
Rebuild Desire streetcar line from N. Rampart Street in CBD to Bywater  
RTA/Bus 
Replacement/Lease 
Maintenance 
Program  
1)   FTA Approp. request for federal share of bus lease/maintenance program.  
 
2)   FTA Approp. request for replacement of 85 buses that will exceed useful life in 
2006 
 3)   TEA-LU authorization for federal share for RTA lease maintenance program 
for remaining years until 2010.  
 4 ) TEA-LU authorization to replace entire RTA bus fleet of 364 buses. 
Superdome 
(Emergency 
Response 
Shelter/Plan) 
Feasibility study planning and design to retrofit Superdome to “refuge of last 
resort”. (State has said does not want Dome used as a shelter of last resort) 
SWB/SELA Southeast La Urban Flood Control Project 
 President’s Budget - $10M  House - $10 M  
 Seeking higher markup in Senate 
SWB/SSERP/I&I A.) Funding through EPA for $10M for Wastewater Inflow & Infiltration project as 
in past.   B.) Amend previous authorization in WRDA and coordinate with 
Jefferson Parish. Request for $3M for Corps of Engineers in Energy & Water. 
Union Passenger 
Terminal 
1. Change language in 06 for FY04 app. for more flexibility – site planning &. 
 
2. Ask for earmark funding for asbestos abatement & canopy replacement over 
track. (rec’d 3 earmarks – one language, 2 funding) 
Chicory Tariff 100% USTR carousel tariff on chicory for 5 years as retaliation for European 
Union tariff on American meat products. Sent letter to eliminate tariff to delegation 
members.  (No Change) 
Climate 
Stewardship Act 
New Orleans is most vulnerable to climate change according to Int’l Climate 
Change Panel study.  Letter sent to Senators to support. (Amendment Failed) 
Coastal Aid Need authorization and funding for complete LA Coastal Area Ecosystem 
Restoration Plan.  $1.28B is federal share of $1.9B project.   
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PROJECT  
                                                  
                                      Continued 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
(Energy Bill-LA gets $540M over 4 yrs.  $15 -17 M dedicated to Orleans Parish 
for Coastal Restoration projects) 
Federal City  Coordinating Federal City Concept. Want to ensure that BRAC analysts consider 
federal city project in scoring our facilities. (Partially Successful l) 
Homeland Security 
Regional HQ 
Encourage the Secretary to establish regional HQ, and choose N.O. as the most 
strategic place for it in this region. 
 (Secretary not interested in Regional HQ) 
Jazz Park  New Orleans Jazz National Historical Park (authorized) 
 (City took no action) 
Lock Project Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock Replacement Project (Industrial Canal) 
 Pres. Bill - $0  House Mark-up $9.38M  ($11.250 M funded pre K; maybe more 
avail in 3rd supp under “commercial navigation & other projects”) 
NASA Michoud to be part of “To Mars & Beyond”.  
 (Successful) 
Neighborhood 1  Coordinates our relations with HUD/HANO on issues, funding  
NFC Maintain existing workforce (approx. 200) & keep NFC primary consolidation 
point for E government/ Maintain Bill Language to market & expand cross 
servicing activities of NFC; ensure back up center stays in Louisiana. (Some 
progress: Language to market & expand cross servicing approved FY 06 Ag 
Approp; Back up Center issue for LA alive; NFC got some new work but lost 
some TSP jobs; most workers returning to LA post K; $35M in 3rd 
supplemental; need $35M more in 2006) 
Renewal 
Community 
Reform & refine existing law to incentivize business & create job opportunities 
 (Expansion to 13 new census tracts to be done by Secretary; City has proposed 
that whole city be RC – legislative action  needed) 
S&WB  Regulatory Issues  
S&WB/Power Plant Power Plant rehabilitation or replacement  
 (Waiting for SWB lead) 
Tax Credits for 
Homeowners 
Amend Internal Revenue Code to coordinate the rehabilitation tax credit and the 
low income housing tax credit.  Congressman Jefferson is a co-author of HR 659.  
(some provisions in GOAONE post K) 
Tri-Dyne Road 
System  
Test Tri-Dyne’s Pro-Active Roadway System on Pontchartrain Blvd.  The $7M 
project will reconstruct the roadway in a manner that can limit future maintenance 
and street restoration costs.  (Not funded) 
  
 Increasing individual and business tax incentives is included much lower on the 
list.  Aside from House Bill HR 659 to amend the Internal Revenue Code to coordinate 
the rehabilitation and low income housing tax credit and the request to expand the 
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Renewal Community into thirteen additional census tracts, there are not many projects 
included which directly influence business development and individual citizen savings.  
 As expected, the city’s priorities shifted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  There 
are only eleven federal “requests”, compared to twenty-five “project” initiatives pre-
Katrina.  The requests are categorized under broader, more over-arching issues like 
“housing,” “transportation,” and “sewer and water” which would fall under the direction 
of specific departments in city government (i.e. Department of Public Works, Sewage & 
Water Board).  In contrast to the city’s pre-Katrina tax relief requests for individuals and 
businesses, post-storm there is significantly more emphasis placed on both the public and 
private sector for financial relief through loans and tax incentives.    
 
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 
Post Katrina Federal Agenda 2005 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Requests    
   
1) Lost Revenue Replacement   6) Housing Agenda 
Operating Costs & Debt Service  1. Gap financing in CDBG 
S&WB/Power Plant  2. HOME Funds 
Lift 20% of entity’s budget limit; payment of 
base salaries & overtime. Need cancellation 
provision back.  
3. Seed Capital                                 
4. Liberty Bond Program 
(residential) 
   
2) Estimate of  Major Capital  Losses  
 
7) Federal City / NSA 
conveyance/DHS Regional HQ 
(Local Streets $1.8B   
Bldg & Rec Infra & Support $648 M $350M)   
   
3) Hurricane Protection & Flood Control  8) Tax Relief  
   
4) CBD to Airport (and to Baton Rouge) 
Light Rail Project  
9) Transportation 
   
5) Parallel Requests from City related 
agencies :   
Airport   
Regional Transit Authority   
Sewerage & Water Board   
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 A specific look at the Orleans-Jefferson Parish Renewal Community (RC) shows 
that before Katrina the city was requesting the expansion of the RC into only thirteen 
census tracts.  Post-Katrina the city placed on its agenda a request that the City of New 
Orleans, in its entirety, be classified as a Renewal Community, amending legislation to 
include 185 census tracts.  The initiation of this request was made through the Mayor’s 
Office of Economic Development.  
 For the purpose of this analysis, the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development’s 
quest to expand the Renewal Community boundaries to include the entire City of New 
Orleans is extracted from other initiatives and specifically explored, particularly focusing 
on the decision-making strategies employed. 
   
In The Trenches 
 
 I took a tour of areas in the city identified as being underdeveloped 
and the department’s top potential industrial, warehouse, commercial corridor 
priorities.  There are 17 wards in the City of New Orleans. Out of the seventeen I 
was specifically assigned to assist in the business development of the now 
internationally famous Lower 9th Ward.   
 I took that tour on Friday, August 26th, boarded up windows with my 
father on Saturday, joked with relatives about who should leave with who for the 
“hurricane,” contemplated where the family should go, questioned whether hotel 
reservations should be made, and reluctantly moved a few things from the 
garage upstairs.  This hurricane, as have many others, was seen as a forced 
vacation.  I remember a cousin jokingly talking loud in a colloquial dialect 
asking, “Who havin’ the hurricane party?”  He remained behind the carpools and 
for nearly two weeks his whereabouts were unknown.   
  
Local Government in Crisis (Two Months Post-Katrina) 
 Expectations for employees during the first two months after Katrina were 
unclear, but it can be inferred that employees managed themselves in the same manner 
post-Katrina that they would have pre-Katrina, with the same information processes and 
established level of expected output.  From the top ranking Assistant Director of the 
Mayor’s Office of Economic Development (MOED) down to the intern, employee 
assignments were mostly delegated with minimal expansion of administrative control.  
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Facing unforeseen and unprecedented economic pitfalls led to the necessity for MOED to 
reassess departmental objectives, staff expectations, organizational structure, protocol, 
and phases of economic development.  In mid-October a department meeting was held 
and a revised departmental precedent was set.  Figure 2.0 gives eight of ten selected 
slides of MOED’s “Staff Precedent Presentation.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¾ C o m m itm e n t to  N e w  O rle a n s
¾ T e a m w o rk
¾ F le x ib ility
¾ L o n g  H o u rs
¾ O p e n -M in d e d  T h in k in g  (O u t-o f-th e -B ox)
¾ N o  S u rp ris e s
G u id in g  P r in c ip le s
3
Phases of De velopm ent
STORM
RECOVERY
REBUILD
4
Current Departm ental Structure
DON
Team  Mem ber Team  Mem ber Team  Mem ber
5
Departm ental Functions
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Business Development W orkforce Development
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3
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D e partm en tal G o als
Goal 1: A thriving and diverse New Orleans  
econom y
Goal 2: A well-trained, diverse and highly-
paid New Orleans workforce
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Goal 1: A thriving and diverse New Orleans economy
OBJECTIVES
• Bring back New Orleans businesses
• Provide access to new contracting opportunities for New Orleans 
businesses
• Provide access to financial assistance to retain New Orleans businesses
• Establish One-Stop Business Recovery Center to facilitate business needs 
(e.g. permits, logistical and technical assistance)
• Establish an Information Outreach Initiative
Goal 2: A well-trained, diverse and highly-paid New 
Orleans workforce
OBJECTIVES
• Provide workforce assistance (e.g. training, housing, transportation, safety)
• “Bring Back New Orleans Workers” Initiative
9
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 Similar in purpose to the existence of MOED pre-storm, the mission of the 
department remained the same, “To Connect People and Businesses to Opportunities.”  
This is to be achieved through the pursuit of achieving two goals.  1) Taking needed steps 
to mold a thriving and diversified economy in New Orleans, and 2) Creating and 
attracting a well-trained workforce with a diversified skill set.  Beginning with the 
organization’s most pertinent resource, its employees, guiding work principles were 
highlighted with the attempt of developing a work environment conducive to meeting the 
city and its citizen’s new challenges.  Although departmental structure is delineated 
below the city’s phases of development, the departmental structure slide is directly linked 
to employee protocol and departmental guiding principles.  This relationship should have 
been portrayed in the presentation.  The Current Department Structure Diagram does not 
realistically portray the department’s process of decision making and implementation.  
There are twenty-two MOED employees post-Katrina, down from fifty-four employees 
pre-Katrina.  Surely, other organizational tiers under the Executive Director exist.   
 Departmental goals are grouped into two categories.  Departmental functions are 
grouped into two categories: Business and Workforce Development.  Departmental 
Structure, if in line with Mayor’s Office of Economic Development’s mission and 
overarching goals, could have had two distinct classifications under the executive 
director, giving further understanding of the channels of implementation and protocol.   
 The organizational structure of MOED is pointed out because in the next sections, 
the bearing of this design will be connected to the department’s decision making 
processes.         
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Renewing the Community? 
… and Naïve Inexperienced Student asked, “If we provide the Expansion for 
Request document with all signatures on it before January 1st can we accept 
CRD applications from businesses in the soon-to-be expanded area?”  “Well, if 
New Orleans can get the document signed and mailed to D.C. before January 
1st then yes, but you still have to have all CRDs approved by the state before 
the first as well.  I’m sure theres a lot of businesses out there right now that 
need the help,” said Washington Mandate Bureaucrat.  “Ambitious.  We might 
need to wait till next year to issue CRDs.  What applicants do you have?  I 
don’t think they’re eligible.  It’s too late,” said Local Veteran Director.        
 
Background 
 The Renewal Community (RC) is a Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) initiative inaugurated under the Community Renewal Tax Relief 
Act of 2000 (CRTR Act).  Viewed as an additional business incentive to pre-existing 
Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, classification as a Renewal 
Community provides a specific urban or rural area additional tax grants, loans, and 
technical assistance.  Through public and private partnerships communities with high 
unemployment and poverty rates and in perpetual economic decline are given incentives 
to attract necessary investment to spur sustainable private economic development (HUD 
2006).  
 The CRTR Act authorized the designation of nine additional Empowerment 
Zones totaling one hundred thirty-four and forty Renewal Communities.  These federally 
targeted areas for community development were segregated from their surrounding 
communities to benefit from a tax incentive package worth $11 billion.  By providing tax 
credits and deductions to businesses in the Renewal Community who hire employees who 
live within the RC and/or may be identified as being in a target group, businesses are 
encouraged to invest tax savings in hiring more employees, purchasing additional 
equipment, and making facility renovations.  There are doubts as to whether the 
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Orleans/Jefferson RC has maximized its use of tax provisions and whether the initiative 
has been successful.  By HUD’s standards it probably has not been measurably 
successful.  Designation as a RC mandates that HUD performance reports (PERMS) be 
completed on an annual basis.  The reports are meant to assist individual RCs in crafting 
clear goals, objectives and output measurements to gauge the program’s success on a 
local level, as well as provide HUD with a sense for the Community Renewal Tax Act’s 
overall business impact.  By assessing performance reports, HUD is also able to provide 
suggestions to CORAs (Coordinating Regional Authorities) to further assist in the  
 development of RCs by maximizing the use of all tax provisions. 
 Although the Orleans/Jefferson CORA was established in 2002 and PERMS 
reports are to be submitted annually, this was not done.  Only one PERMS report had 
been submitted to HUD by November 2005 for the year 2002.  MOED was informed of 
this in November and asked to submit the report for 2003 soon, so as to begin completing 
the annual report for 2004.  With a file cabinet half-full of unorganized files, cumulative 
data was insufficient.  Suffice it to say that the PERMS reports eventually submitted, 
three years late, were “hypothesized” educated guesses made through surface level 
observation.  Lack of self-performance measurement from the past RC Director in 
MOED, and the inability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to discern between 
community programs that provide varied amounts of wage credits (i.e. Enterprise and 
HUB zones), make gauging the Orleans/Jefferson RC’s success cumulatively inaccurate.  
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 In regards to employee hiring provisions given through RC wage credits, Work 
Opportunity Tax Credits (WOTC), zero percent capital gains attainment on property held 
Renewal Community Business Incentives:     
Employee Hiring Provisions    
Wage Credit Work Opportunity Tax Credit Welfare to Work Credit   
Up to $1,500 or 15% of any 
employee’s salary up to $10,000 
for each employee who lives and 
works in the renewal community.       
Up to $2,400 for employees hired 
from groups that have high 
unemployment rates or other 
special employment needs, 
including youth ages 18 to 24 that 
live in the renewal community. 
Other qualified groups include 
veterans, ex-felons, food stamp 
recipients, vocational rehabilitation 
referrals and summer youth. 
Up to $3,500 for the first year and 
$5000 for the second year for 
each new hire of someone on 
long-term family assistance.  
 
Property 
Acquisition/Revitalization 
Provision 
   
Commercial Revitalization Deduction Environmental Clean up Cost 
Deduction 
Zero Percent Capital Gains Rate Low-income Housing 
Credit 
Allows businesses that construct or 
rehabilitate commercial property to 
deduct a portion of the costs over a 
shorter period of time than 
permitted under standard 
depreciation rules.  
Allows businesses looking for land 
to deduct clean up costs of 
hazardous substances in qualified 
areas.   
A business that holds an asset for 
at least five years does not have to 
pay taxes on the profit of its sale.  
Ten year credit for 
owners of newly 
constructed or renovated 
rental housing who set 
aside a number of units 
for low-income 
residents. The State must 
allocate a portion of its 
annual cap. 
Equipment Purchase Provision    
Increased Section 179 Deduction       
Allows businesses to take a 
deduction of up to $35,000 on 
equipment purchases. That lets 
businesses deduct all or part of the 
equipment cost the year it is 
purchased instead of deducting the 
expense over time.  
   
    
Investor Provisions    
New Markets Tax Credit       
Investors in qualified projects can 
obtain a tax credit of 5 to 6 percent 
of the amount invested for each of 
the years the investment is held, for 
up to seven years of the credit 
period.  
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for a minimum of five years, and increased section 179 deductions for equipment 
purchase, there is not a federal mechanism yet in place to cumulatively determine 
whether the Renewal Community incentive package in and of itself independent of 
external factors assists the business community in impoverished areas.  The Internal 
Revenue Service does not differentiate tax credits and deductions given to businesses in 
the Renewal Community from those given in Empowerment/Enterprise/HUB Zones.  
Outside of inquiring from local businesses how much they saved by filing for these 
incentives at the end of each tax season, Renewal Community incentives for hiring, 
purchasing equipment, and saving when selling property with the zero percent capital 
gains rate is not cumulatively captured, and therefore the argument that HUD’s Renewal 
Community initiative for impoverished communities attracts, retains and scales up 
existing businesses lacks sufficient evidence.     
 Files for commercial revitalization deductions (CRDs) on a local, state and federal 
level are better maintained. CRDs allow businesses to accelerate their cost for renovation 
expenditures more rapidly.  Businesses in the RC can opt to deduct renovation costs from 
their federal taxes over the course of ten or thirty-nine years.  This provision assists 
business owners with their bottom-line by cutting their tax debt and allowing them to 
keep more money in their pocket, enabling them to re-invest in their business at an 
accelerated pace.   
 Twelve million dollars worth of CRDs are allotted to each of the four RCs in 
Louisiana.  The Orleans/Jefferson RC has never allocated its full amount of CRDs in any 
given year since the program’s inauguration in 2002.  The downside to the RC’s inability 
to do so means a loss of potential business revitalization that can not roll over and be 
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allocated in subsequent years.  Whatever money is not allocated is lost.  Beginning in 
2003, out of $12 million, the Orleans/Jefferson RC allocated $5 million, and in 2004, $7 
million.  As of August 2005, pre-Katrina, no monies had been allotted to any business 
owners for business revitalization in the RC.  MOED’s deadline for delivering business 
applications to the state Department of Economic Development (LED) was October 1, 
2005.   
 Based on evidence provided in this report a concluding thought would be that the 
Orleans-Jefferson Urban Parish RC pre-Katrina lacked credibility in “renewing the 
community.”  There is no clear way to tell whether the federal initiative, of course 
implemented at a local level, had a significant if any impact on the community with its 
designation, if even at all, the evidence points in the direction that the RC designation has 
not had the positive impact on the community intended.  There is no way to justify that 
businesses which decided to open there, remain there, hired more employees, or 
purchased better equipment  did so because of knowledge of RC tax benefits.  Even with 
the allocation of commercial revitalization deductions, the question arises as whether the 
CRD allocations had any tantamount bearing on the business’ choice to re-invest and 
rehabilitate property.  It may also simply be too early to determine MOED’s success with 
the initiative.   
Mistakes in RC Inauguration & Expansion  
 Renewal Community designations are spearheaded at the local level and 
acknowledged by HUD only after local governments have submitted completed 
applications.  Based on what the local government submits, the community is assessed 
for meeting HUD RC requirements and granted RC designation.  The Mayor’s Office of 
 16
Economic Development (MOED) led the Renewal Community inauguration initiative 
and presented six census tracts in Orleans parish and one in Jefferson parish to HUD.  In 
2002, the two parishes were identified as meeting HUD’s population, poverty and 
unemployment formula for designation as a Renewal Community based on the data of 
seven locally submitted and federally qualified census tracts.   
 What was not realized until 2005 pre-Katrina was that MOED had mistakenly 
omitted six census tracts which would have qualified in 2002, but no longer qualified in 
2005.  These census tracts were 5800, 5900, 6000, 8400, 8500, and 8600.  This omission 
was realized when the former RC director began the process of amending RC boundaries 
to include sixteen additional census tracts.2  Only thirteen of nineteen requested census 
tracts were accepted by HUD on the premise that the above six census tracts had lower 
unemployment and poverty rates in 2000 than in 1990, showing an “improvement.”  If 
MOED had  requested the six census tracts in addition to the original seven initially, the 
total number of census tracts classified as an RC at the time of inauguration in 2002 
would have thirteen, not only seven.  A local government can request that a RC’s 
boundaries be expanded at any time, but must meet the requirement of showing increases 
in poverty and unemployment, irregardless of whether the two statistics meet the 
threshold of 9.4% unemployment and 20% poverty.   
 
 
  
                                                          
2 Every census tract included in the RC means more businesses having the advantage of saving and re-
investing in their businesses and thus the community.   
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 It was however found that although MOED’s request to have census tracts 5800, 
5900, 6000, 8400, 8500, 8600 be included in the RC was denied, census tracts 4401, 
4900, 5000, 6400, 6500, 9400, 10300, 11200, 11900, 12101, 12102, 12300, and 12600 
showed an increase in unemployment and poverty and met HUD’s requirement of having 
a minimum of 9.4% rate of unemployment and poverty rate of 20%.  These tracts could 
therefore be included in the RC boundary.  MOED rejected 11900, 12101, 12102, and 
12600 as HUD qualified and proposed additions on the grounds that the areas HUD was 
identifying as impoverished were anything but poor and underdeveloped.  Many students 
lived in the area and attended well-known private institutions (Loyola and Tulane 
University), the housing there did not appear dilapidated, and furthermore was located 
adjacent in the city’s Garden District, an area known for being “well-to-do.”  
  It was determined by MOED that amending the RC boundary to include those 
four census tracts would increase political tension between city council members and thus 
their districts.  MOED feared that a decision to include those census tracts would be 
viewed by the public as being a “conspiracy” to enrich the rich and ignore the poor.  
However, this decision to not accept the three HUD approved census tracts based on 
potential political tension was held pre-Katrina 2005.      
Expansion of the Renewal Community 
 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, MOED pushed for the expansion of the 
Renewal Community designation.  The Director of MOED delegated the task of 1) 
expanding the RC boundary to include thirteen additional census tracts based on current 
HUD guidelines and 2) identifying all census tracts which would have qualified for RC 
classification originally based on 1990 data, submitting this data to HUD and ask that 
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they be flexible and despite their guidelines not compare 1990 data to 2000 data, and 3) 
facilitating discussion and garnering support needed to congressionally amend HUD 
guidelines so that all of New Orleans could be classified as a RC on the grounds that the 
RC initiative be amended to designate RC status to communities based on their most 
current statistics, not those of 1990 or 2000 (U.S. Census ten year reports), which may 
not delineate an accurate picture of the community’s economy.   
 While targeting these three goals, an intern included the goal of allocating $12 
million in Commercial Revitalization Deductions (CRDs) to businesses in both the 
existing and soon-to-be expanded RC based on HUD’s current guidelines.  Within 
thirteen business days, $11.1 million in CRD allocation applications were submitted to 
the state, meeting the deadline for December 30, 2005 that had been extended from 
October 1, 2005 due to Hurricane Katrina.   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
2003 
Ye Olde 
College Inn $442,209.64  
  
Critical Care 
Car Wash $514,029.99  
  
Five Happiness 
Restaurant $307,378.94  
  
Carl E. 
Woodward LLC $2,400,000  
Total  $3,663,618.57  
     
2002 
Carrolton 
Shopping Plaza $7,087,505  
2005   
Company Name CRD Amount 
Helm Paint & Supply  $1,700,000 
Popeyes Chicken & $196,600 
Biscuits   
La Strada Inn, Inc.  $750,000 
Security Iron Co., Inc.  $458,550 
Morphy, Makofsky  $419,732 
Bayou Coffee House  $75,588 
Delta World Tire Co.  $300,000 
French Riviera Spa $61,464 
Elgee Uniforms  $59,421 
Duplain W. Rhodes $1,700,000 
Funeral Home   
Rhodes Commercial $4,500,000 
Dev. LLC   
Oliver H. Van Horn $900,064 
Co., LLC   
Total  $11,121,419 
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 Under current HUD guidelines a designated Renewal Community must meet the 
geographic, population, and economic condition requirements for expansion into other 
census tracts (HUD 2006).  The guidelines are the following: 
• Every amended RC must have a contiguous boundary 
• The amended RC must maintain a population of no more than 200,000 
• Each census tract must have a poverty rate of at least 20%, and must be higher in  
 2000 than in 1990  
• Also, HUD will confirm that in each of the requested amended census tracts that 
 the unemployment rate is at least 9.4%, and is higher in 2000 than in 1990   
 
 Only a small portion of New Orleans qualified as a RC, approximately .02% of 
the city’s land mass with nearly 60 small businesses post-katrina, amounting to 30% of 
the city’s 1,800 businesses re-opened post-Katrina. The entire RC received flood waters 
as low as 3 ft. to as high as 7 ft. from Hurricane Katrina (FEMA 2005).          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
 Post-Katrina 2005, MOED made the argument with HUD again that they would 
be willing to lose out on census tracts 11900, 12101, 12102, and 12600 in exchange for 
census tracts 5800, 5900, 6000, 6800, 8400, 8500, and 8600 which not only visibly 
showed signs of poverty, despite U.S. Census data that the area had decreased in 
unemployment and poverty, but would house some of the city’s major economic 
development initiatives.  These initiatives were the Biomedical District and Hollywood 
South.  HUD immediately stated that doing so would necessitate congressional 
amendment, and could not be handled in-house on HUD’s administrative level.  HUD 
also gave MOED the heads up on what was happening within the department’s own state 
legislature and Congress.  Through a series of conference calls HUD explained a bill that 
was in the process of being passed to decrease the tax burden of businesses in the Gulf 
Coast.    
 Focusing solely on the desire of having HUD take actions which it did not have 
the power to take and classify three non-qualifying census tracts as a part of the RC, in 
addition to requesting that HUD assist the city in its entirety be designated as an RC, 
MOED continued in its pursuit of writing letters to congressmen and top HUD 
bureaucrats to support its wishes, ignoring the oncoming of the Gulf Opportunity Zone 
Act of 2005 (GO Zone).  Ultimately, despite time and energy invested MOED was only 
allowed to include the areas which HUD had initially pre-determined for eligibility based 
on their current guidelines, and had missed any opportunity to have input in the crafting 
of the GO Zone bill.  
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Gulf Opportunity Zone 
“What was that?  What are they talking about?  Thirty-one parishes in 
Louisiana all getting tax incentives…You know this mayor in Baton Rouge is 
really beginning to piss me off!  What the hell does he mean – he wants to 
make sure East Baton Rouge, of all places, is gonna’ get its cut?  He’s got extra 
expenses from the increase in his population?  What!?  He’s getting all da’ 
extra sales tax from all the people living up there that used to live down here...  
I’ll tell ya’ guys.  Excuse my language ladies… but… Jefferson parish is 
gonna’ kick you’re a*#.” 
-Small business owner in New Orleans speaking to Director of MOED 
 
GO Zone’s Purpose 
 On September 16, 2005 in a televised address in the historic French Quarter of 
New Orleans at Jackson Square, President Bush outlined his plans to the nation to assist 
in the Gulf Coast’s recovery efforts and to prevent bureaucratic errors like those which 
had slowed the response to Hurricane Katrina.  In the president’s plan to ameliorate the 
region in the aftermath of the most destructive hurricane ever (according to the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) he proposed among other key initiatives the 
creation of a Gulf Opportunity Zone (CNN 2005).   
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 H.R. 4440 (P.L. 109-155) was signed by 
the President three months later on December 21, 2005 while MOED worked expediently 
to have New Orleans, alone, classified as a Renewal Community for non-inexplicable 
reasons.  MOED was not in sync with state governing entities.  For well-defined areas of 
the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama state and federal legislators decided to 
provide immediate help on taxes, housing, education, and job training for the victims of 
Katrina.  Only areas defined as that portion of hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita as 
Core Disaster Areas determined by the President to warrant assistance under the Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act are included in the GO Zone.  Communities within 
the zone are provided incentives for the purpose of creating jobs, providing tax relief for 
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small businesses, and loans and loan guarantees for small businesses which would 
include those which are minority-owned (LA GO Zone Business Guide 2006).   
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Gulf Opportunity Zone Provisions 
Tax-Emempt Bond Financing  
Present an opportunity for private business owners and corporations to borrow capital at very 
favorable tax-exempt rates to acquire, construct, reconstruct or renovate non-residential real 
property, qualified residential rental projects, and public utility property in the GO Zone. 
Restricted to governmental agencies, qualified private activity bonds, or not-for-profit organizations. 
These restrictions on tax-exempt debt have been modified by Congress in the GO Zone to allow 
private business owners and corporations the advantage for a limited time. 
Interest on these GO Zone bonds will be exempt from both federal and state income taxes and will be 
exempt from inclusion in the federal Alternative Minimum Tax; therefore, the interest rates will be 
significantly lower (as much as 1.5% to 2%) than rates available through conventional financing. 
Bonus Deprectiation 
Taxpayers are now allowed an additional depreciation deduction equal to 50% of the depreciable basis 
of qualified GO Zone property for the first year the property is placed in service. 
Qualified property includes:  Tangible personal property, computer software other than software that 
would be amortized over 15 years, water/utility property, qualified leasehold improvement property, 
non-residential real property, residential real property.  
Increased Section 179 Expensing 
Under the GO Zone Act, the $108,000 maximum amount that a taxpayer may elect to deduct under 
Section 179 in 2006 and 2007 is increased by the lesser of $100,000 or the cost of qualified Section 
179 GO Zone property placed in service during the taxable year. 
The $430,000 phase-out ceiling for this benefit is also raised substantially to $1,030,000. 
Enhanced Net Operating Loss Carryback 
A net operating loss is the amount by which a taxpayer's allowable deductions exceed the taxpayer's 
gross income. In general, a NOL may be carried back in the GO Zone five years instead of only two 
years and carried forward 20 years to offset taxable income in such years. 
Increased Tax Credit for Rehabilitation Expenditures 
The amount of rehabilitation tax credits is increased from 20% to 26% for historic buildings and from 
10% to 13% for buildings placed in service before 1936, for any certified structure or qualified 
rehabilitated building located in the GO Zone. 
Clean-up, Remediatation, and Timber Reforestation Costs 
Taxpayers in a trade or business may claim a 50% deduction for costs paid or incurred in the GO Zone 
on or after Aug. 28, 2005, and before Jan. 1, 2008, to clean up and remove debris from real property 
or to demolish structures. 
In dealing with hurricane losses, the cleanup cost and adjusted basis of the structure that was 
damaged can be used in computing the casualty loss caused by the storms. 
Enhancement of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits 
The GO Zone Act provides for a greater allocation of low-income housing tax credits for the affected 
areas, increases the number of persons that qualify as low-income, and increases the amount of 
financing that results from using the credit. These liberalizations make building in the GO Zone more 
attractive to investors both in terms of the amount of the credit available and the threshold for 
poverty that tenants must meet. 
Gozoneguide.com 
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Gulf Opportunity Zone Provisions 
Tax Credits for Employers 
The GO Zone Act extends many of the provisions in KETRA to the Rita GO Zone, including the new 
Employee Retention Tax Credit and KETRA's enhancement of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit. And 
while the primary emphasis of KETRA was on tax relief for individuals, Congress recognized that the 
individual tax relief would be beneficial to many small businesses, whose owners were turning to 
personal savings and credit in an effort to help workers and save their businesses. 
Work Opportunity Tax Credit  
KETRA provided a new targeted group, which is "Hurricane Katrina employees." This group consists 
of individuals whose "principal abode" as of Aug. 28, 2005, was in the core disaster area. 
For purposes of calculation of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, for employees who work more than 
400 hours, the credit will equal 40% of their first year's qualified wages not in excess of $6,000. For 
employees who work equal to or less than 400 hours but more than 120 hours, the credit equals 
25% of their first year qualified wages not in excess of $6,000. 
If the employer is located outside the core disaster area, they must have hired the qualifying 
employee by Dec. 31, 2005. If the employer is located within the core disaster area, they will have 
two years from Aug. 28, 2005, to hire a Hurricane Katrina employee and qualify for the credit. 
Employee Retention Credit 
New to the tax law is an income tax credit for "eligible employers" who continued to pay employees 
during the period their business was inoperable between Aug. 27 and Dec. 31, 2005, as a result of 
damage sustained by hurricanes Katrina, Wilma or Rita. This credit is calculated on 40% of the 
qualified wages paid to each eligible employee up to $6,000 of wages. 
  
Personal Casualty Losses 
For many years, most taxpayers have not been able to benefit from these provisions because of two 
specific limitations. First, the casualty loss amount had to exceed $100, and second, the amount 
deductible was further limited by an amount equal to 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 
KETRA has changed this by removing the two limitations on any losses that arose from hurricanes 
Katrina, Wilma or Rita on or after Aug. 24, 2005, in the disaster area. 
Since this was a presidentially declared disaster, the casualty losses incurred after Aug. 25, 2005, 
can be reported on either the 2005 individual return or the taxpayer can elect to report the loss in 
the year immediately preceding the taxable year, 2004. 
  
New Market Tax Credits 
The NMTC Program permits individual and corporate taxpayers to receive a credit against federal 
income taxes for making qualified equity investments in investment vehicles known as Community 
Development Entities (CDEs). 
Treasury's CDFI Fund has combined the 2005 and 2006 amounts and thus will allocate an additional 
$600 million of NMTC authority for specific use in the GO Zone in 2006. This is in addition to the 
previously announced allocation authority for the NMTC program of $3.5 billion annually for 2006 and 
2007. 
  
Gozoneguide.com 
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The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 began as the second stage of tax relief for 
the Gulf Coast.  The first incentive package was administered through KETRA P.L. 109-
73 (Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005), and provided for only those in the Gulf 
region affected by Hurricane Katrina.  KETRA grew into the larger bill (GO Zone) after 
the oncoming of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, bestowing federal tax and loan assistance to 
an increased number of citizens and businesses in the region (News Channel 5 on Your 
Side 2006).  The GO Zone consists of the following principal elements:      
 The GO Zone has only received minimal criticism mostly pertaining to tax write-
offs provided to gambling casinos amounting to millions of dollars in savings, though 
possibly more attention should have been placed on the overtly inclusiveness of the GO 
Zone’s boundaries (Weisman Sept. 2005).   
The GO Zone “Pork” Package 
 In a very different tone than previous Gulf Coast incentive packages White House 
officials in the very early stages of the GO Zone’s proposal intended to include the 
gaming industry in the list of industries eligible for receiving tax breaks regarding 
investment in equipment and structure.  This intention was welcomed and endorsed by 
the gaming industry of course and Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour (Weisman 
Sept. 2005).   
 The necessity to grant incentives to the gaming industry of Mississippi, in 
particular, had not been needed in the past, and some economic experts in the state still 
contend that the industry can do very well and bounce back from 2005’s hurricane season 
without them.  An economist at the University of Mississippi, William F. Shughart II, 
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vocally acknowledged that even if the casinos were eligible, providing such tax hand-outs 
to them would be a waste of money.   
 This example of the indiscriminate nature of the president’s proposal welcomed 
by Governor Barbour sharpened criticism in Congress of the federal administration’s 
rebuilding effort.  Sen. Max Baucus (Mont.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance 
Committee, recommended a day after the GO Zone proposal that a panel convene fact-
finding hearings to examine how many properties are insured and what incentives 
different industries need to rebuild.  Conducting such research would surely decrease the 
amount of wasted, yet desperately needed federal revenue which could be returned to 
disaster areas and disbursed for recovery in infinite ways.  Federal tax revenues generated 
from gaming could potentially be reallocated to qualifying community development 
entities or given in community development block grants to discriminately renew 
hurricane disaster areas with the greatest need within the gaming businesses’ state.  A 
senior Republican tax aide on the committee commented on the fact that existing 
legislation creating similar tax-favored zones excludes gambling facilities as well as golf 
courses, country clubs, massage parlors, tanning salons, hot tub facilities and liquor 
stores.  The tax aide attributed tax legislation being written this way to past political 
reluctance to subsidize unpopular industries as well as the understanding that businesses 
“like gambling simply do not need such support” (Weisman 2005).  The latter part of the 
quote is most pertinent.  Why provide tax incentives or assistance to industries which 
demonstrate resilience and the ability to profit in the aftermath of 2005’s hurricane 
season while they continue to create jobs, train their employees, purchase equipment, and 
make costly renovations independently?  The money should go elsewhere.  
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Both Republicans and Democrats have admonished the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency's $5 billion effort to purchase 300,000 trailers and mobile homes, 
despite record-low apartment occupancy rates in states just beyond Katrina's reach.  
Democrats also moved to repeal Bush's suspension of federal wage supports, which 
require federal contractors to pay workers prevailing local wages, on federally financed 
construction projects in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and lightly affected South 
Florida. Dozens of House Republicans have proposed significant spending cuts -- many 
of them on signature Bush programs -- to finance hurricane relief.    
"What Hurricane Katrina destroyed in hours will take years to rebuild," Baucus 
(D) said. "The public expects the government to be careful with taxpayer dollars and put 
them to use in a smart and practical manner" (2005).  White House spokesman Trent 
Duffy (R) said, “The federal government should not be picking which businesses should 
or should not rebuild. The emphasis of tax incentives should be to get people back to 
work, he said, and that means rebuilding structures as fast as possible” (2005).  The 
argument is not which businesses should be rebuilt, but which businesses and 
communities need “government assistance” to rebuild, and to what extent.     
Determined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be 
eligible for individual and/or public assistance from the federal government, the 
Louisiana GO Zone covers thirty-one parishes identified by FEMA as Core Disaster 
Areas.  The parishes include:  Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East 
Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, 
Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee, St. Bernard, St. Charles, 
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St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, 
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge and West Feliciana 
(FEMA 2005).   
The Congressional Research Service estimates that 700,000 or more people have 
been significantly impacted by Hurricane Katrina, due to residing in areas that flooded or 
sustained significant structural damage.  With an estimated 77% of Orleans’ population 
affected, and nearly all residents of St. Bernard, the CRS analysis shows that Orleans and 
St. Bernard parish in Louisiana were disproportionately harder hit by flooding, 
amounting to approximately half of the individuals displaced by the hurricane to have 
lived specifically in New Orleans.  With a combined population of 2.5 million people, 
only sixteen counties are reported to have received some flooding and/or structural 
damage based on FEMA flood and damage assessments, however thirty-one parishes are 
identified by FEMA as being in the Core Disaster Area and have been given equal access 
to tax provisions found in the GO Zone.   
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes 
a range of federal aid for states, localities, and households in the event of a federally 
declared major disaster.  There are two major categories of assistance:  Public assistance 
which encompasses various forms of aid to state and local governments and some 
nonprofit organizations, and federal assistance to individuals and households (Gabe, Falk 
and McCarty 2005).  The Stafford Act provides presidential discretion in designating 
areas as eligible for disaster aid, however, regulations include the following factors for 
considering whether individual and household assistance should be available in an area: 
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1. Concentration of damage 
2. Degree of trauma to a state and communities 
3. Special populations  
4. Extent to which state and local or voluntary agencies can meet needs 
5. Amount of insurance coverage in an area 
6. Amount of individual assistance provided by the state 
 
Ultimately, the Stafford Act considers large numbers of injuries or deaths, large 
scale disruptions of normal community functions, and emergency needs such as extended 
or widespread loss of power, and whether the disaster area includes low-income, elderly 
or unemployed persons.      
On the 1 to 5 Saffir-Simpson scale Hurricane Katrina was a midlevel Category 3 
at the time of landfall.  The storm’s barometric pressure was 902 millibars (mb), the sixth 
lowest ever recorded, but still higher than Hurricanes Wilma (882 mb) and Rita (897 mb).  
At Katrina’s peak after making landfall it sustained a wind speed of 125 mph. 55 miles 
south of New Orleans.  By the time the storm touched down in the Big Easy, wind speeds 
barely reached “hurricane” defined strength, however, it is noted that Katrina’s winds are 
still ranked the eighth strongest winds of all hurricanes recorded at landfall.  The 
magazine, Popular Mechanics, called Katrina “a large but typical hurricane.”  Sweeping 
across 250 mi. of coastline, pushing forward an unusually severe storm surge reaching 
over 30 ft. in some low lying areas, begirding three states, and traveling more than 100 
mi. inland, the storm devastated communities primarily to its east (Popular Mechanics 
March 2006).   
So then a crucial question is developed from the argument that “businesses should 
be rebuilt, but only a select group of businesses and communities need government 
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assistance to rebuild, and to a determined extent.”  Did destruction inflicted upon thirty-
one parishes in the State of Louisiana necessitate them all having access to business 
assistance pieces of GO Zone legislation?   
Katrina Damage Assessment 
 When the GO Zone legislation was written thirty-one parishes listed in FEMA’s 
core disaster area in Louisiana are entitled to the following business incentives: 
• Bonus Depreciation 
• Increased Section 179 Expensing 
• Enhanced Net Operating Loss Carryback 
• Increased Tax Credit for Rehabilitation Expenditures 
• Cleanup, Remediation, & Timber Reforestation Costs 
• Enhancement of Low-income Housing Tax Credits 
• Worker Opportunity Tax Credit 
• Employee Retention Credit 
When President Bush spoke to the nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans on 
December 21, 2005 he re-stated that “our job and our goal for the Gulf Coast was not to 
survive, but to thrive, and not just to cope, but to overcome” (The White House Dec. 
2005).   Looking at maps showing where the highest rainfall fell, where the worst 
flooding occurred, where the strongest winds blew, it appears that the thirty-one parishes 
included in the GO Zone did not all experience severe winds, destructive rainfall, and 
flooding.  Finding qualitative and quantitative data to support a claim for several parishes 
that they experienced large amounts of devastation is difficult.  It is suspect whether these 
hardly scathed parishes should benefit from business tax incentives intended to assist 
local businesses through tax savings and the attraction of new investment.  These 
eighteen suspect parishes are: Acadia, East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, East 
Feliciana, Assumption, Ascension, St. James, Iberville, Jefferson-Davis, Sabine, Allen, 
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Lafayette, Evangeline, Livingston, Point Coupee, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, and 
Washington.3          
FEMA’s damage assessment is characterized by several damage categories 
classified under two sectors: 
Structural Damage 
• Catastrophic Damage:  Most solid and all light or mobile structures are 
destroyed 
• Extensive Damage: Some solid structures are destroyed; most sustain exterior 
and interior damage (e.g. roofs are missing, interior walls exposed), most mobile 
homes and light structures are destroyed 
• Moderate Damage: Solid structures sustain exterior damage (e.g. missing roofs 
or roof segments); some mobile homes and light structures are destroyed, many 
are damaged and displaced 
• Limited Damage: Generally superficial damage to solid structures (e.g. loss of 
tiles or roof shingles; some mobile homes and light structures are damaged or 
displaced 
Flood/water Damage 
• Flood: Indicates a separate severe damage category related to the specific effects 
of flooding 
• Saturated Area: Indicates the possibility of water damage due to saturated soil. 
CRS estimates that more than 700,000 people lived in neighborhoods that either 
experienced catastrophic, extensive, or moderate flooding or structural damage 
throughout the three Gulf states.  Approximately 657,000 people lived in areas that were 
flooded.  This accounts for more than 90% of individuals most acutely impacted by the 
storm.  Approximately 26% also lived in areas with either catastrophic, extensive, or 
moderate structural damage.  54,000 people lived in non-flooded areas impacted by 
                                                          
3 These parishes do not exhibit extensive or catastrophic damage from either Katrina or Rita.   A few of 
these parishes do not exhibit mild damage. 
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catastrophic, extensive, or moderate wind and/or surging water.  97% of the total affected 
population resided in Louisiana (Gabe, Falk and McCarty 2005).   
Flood waters by far were the most destructive force from nature.  Three-quarters 
of Orleans’ parish population is estimated to have been affected by flood waters, half of 
Plaquemines parish (south east of New Orleans), two-fifths of Jefferson parish (directly 
west and south of New Orleans), and for the most part, all of St. Bernard Parish (97% of 
its entire population, located directly south-east of New Orleans.  Conclusively, in 
Louisiana, Orleans parish accounted for the majority of the state’s population impacted 
by extensive damage (Gabe, Falk and McCarty 2005).     
It can be concluded that these three areas having a disproportionate amount of 
affected individuals in comparison to the other “core disaster areas,” should have 
received a business tax incentive package far greater than that given in the GO Zone to all 
thirty-one core disaster classified areas; or the fifteen “suspect” parishes mentioned 
previously should have been excluded from receiving tax provisions.  The maps and 
tables below provide further credence to the GO Zone being overly inclusive and 
unnecessarily made accessible to several counties, though business insurance claims 
would further validate this argument.4  The attraction and appeal of the GO Zone to 
potential investors to heavily affected areas has been compromised.   
One can see from looking at the maps below that   only the extreme south east of 
the state received heavy winds, which are noted by Popular Mechanics as “barely 
reaching hurricane strength” after making landfall.  Rainfall from Katrina only measured 
                                                          
4 Insurance claims have not yet been provided to the public for hurricane affected parishes.   
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over a foot in approximately fifteen parishes and Katrina is noted as a worse hurricane 
than both Wilma and Rita.5  If viewing a FEMA map one finds very little mile, extensive, 
or catastrophic damage outside those parishes bordering New Orleans and the very 
bottom of the state’s coastline.6       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Rainfall amounts for Hurricane Katrina were not the primary impact of the storm.  
 
6 Totals are incomplete due to storm damage experienced at many stations along the immediate Gulf coast. 
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Population affected by flooding or structural 
damage 
Selected 
Parishes 
Total population in 
selected parishes Total  Flooding
Jefferson 100% 40.8 39.7
Lafource 100% 0.1 0
Livingston 100% 0 0
Orleans 100% 77.1 76.8
Plaquemines 100% 48.8 42.4
St. Bernard 100% 96.9 96.6
St. Charles 100% 1.4 1.3
St. Tammany 100% 3.5 2.4
Tangipahoa 100% 0 0
Whether state legislators decided to roll out GO Zone boundaries on a “if you ask, 
we’ll supply basis,” or chose to request as much from Congress as they could; thinking 
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the more the state received the better without concerning themselves with being overly 
inclusive, the boundaries defined in the GO Zone have led to those communities not in 
need overshadowing those in need of business retention, development, and savings.  Non-
devastated GO Zone communities have become ideal places to relocate or remain in if a 
business had post-Katrina chosen to relocate its operations there while waiting to return 
to it’s pre-Katrina community.  The incentives intended to attract investment more easily 
are detoured off the path of locating in communities most heavily devastated and are 
actually given incentives to pursue entrepreneurship in communities which at this time 
are not in need because they all have access to the same GO Zone incentive package.  
This issue directly fuels interstate competition, but unfortunately automatically places 
heavily devastated communities not unlike New Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, and 
Plaquemines parish in a compromised and competitively inferior position.     
Whether the GO Zone was purposefully issued as pork to surrounding parishes, or 
as is normally expected, the federal and state government pushed forth a bill simply filled 
with waste can both be examined.  This legislation with broad boundaries resulted in the 
state of Louisiana losing the advantage of creating concentrated investment in the most 
needed communities, which by and large happen to generate the state’s largest sales tax 
base, oil refineries, and fisheries.  The state’s agenda, just what they were trying to 
accomplish is blurry; however, it can be estimated that legislatures were trying to get as 
much as they could, in the fastest, least controversial way, jeopardizing 1) the social 
contract between communities most in need and government’s redistributive role, and 2) 
the ability to attract and sustain incrementally planned, concentrated, economic 
 37
investment in urban and rural communities resulting in successes attributed to regional 
state influenced planning.   
Crisis Decision-Making 
“You know, I’m really thankful for the tax incentives.  So, I mean, you tell me 
– what is the city going to do?  We’re a million dollar business.  What can the 
city provide me that will help my business?  We need help!  Tax incentives are 
nice, but these come after the fact.  What assistance can I be provided right 
now?  We already started renovations – my whole roof came off my warehouse 
– office – flooded.  I’m repairing it – moved my office and I’m leasing next 
door, but look at the block!  Nobody’s coming back, no street lights.  What do I 
tell my women employees who gotta’ leave my building between dusk and dark 
with no street lights on.  There’s no where to eat lunch – nothing’s open.  I had 
a contract with Avondale Shipyard for five years.  You know what they did?  
Gave it to a company in Missouri!! – after the state of Louisiana gave them $50 
million the year before.  Remember that?  Now you tell me!  I gotta’ tell 
ya’…I’m angry!  What am I supposed to do?  What is the city gonna’ do?  I 
love New Orleans, that’s why I’m here.  Been here 75 yrs, minority owned.  
I’ve heard what the feds gonna’ do.  What’s the city gonna’ provide to stop me 
from going to Jefferson parish, going to St. Charles?”… “tell you the truth, I 
really need business.”       
-New Orleanian CEO speaking with Executive Director of MOED 
 
Decision-Making Theory 
 One of the most frightening, yet fascinating subjects in history are crises.  
Unplanned, they occur suddenly, threaten vital interests, and raise enormous uncertainties 
threatening the status quo, demanding quick decisions to be made by leaders under 
intense pressure (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).   
 Most recent analytical studies of decision-making as well as historical accounts 
indicate that a modern state is in no way a monolithic or unitary actor.  As delineated by 
Allison and Halperin, the process of decision making is comprised of multiple actors 
representing several different individual officials and their constituencies with 
bureaucratic positions and careers to protect and many organizations or groups with 
varying interests, values, objectives, and interpretations of the national “interest” in given 
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situations (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).  The actors referred to connote those elected 
officials present at the local level in state legislatures during the bargaining process of the 
GO Zone tax package for Louisiana.   
Crisis management theory recognizes the importance of and complexity in 
analyzing how decisions are made in a crisis domestically and internationally.  
Bargaining occurs not only between states, but also within states or groups of states, 
making the formation of conclusions about decision-making theories difficult.  Different 
conceptions of how governments make decisions aimed at different degrees of analysis 
produce very different images of bargaining, how it is carried out, and what its chances 
are for success (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).      
 There are varying ideologies regarding the purpose of managing and studying 
crises.  Many theorists concerned with crisis management concentrate their attention on 
1)Changes in the composition of flexibility of contending alliances and alliance systems, 
2) Systemic efforts by international organizations toward conflict resolution in interstate 
security disputes, 3)The process or organizational context in which decisions are reached 
during periods of intense crises, 4) Select aspects of bargaining during crisis management 
5) Crisis management in regards to outcomes among participants as they bargain with 
each other, 6) How decisions are made in a crisis, 7) To uncover defects in decision 
makers that have been harmful in past crises (Gilbert and Lauren 1980).  Several of the 
listed study sequences pertain to crises which are not seen as opportunities at all, but as 
disasters which if not managed could result in war.  However, these ideologies are also 
pertinent to the study of domestic public policy crises.  As a result of many studies, the 
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study of crisis management has become a “no man’s land sown with uncharted 
minefields,” as described by one scholar, but it should be acknowledged that an 
overwhelming number  of studies are conducted pertaining to crises in times of potential 
war threats (Bell 1971).  Less attention is given to crises withstood by local governments 
within states.        
Model 1 Complete Problem Solver Model 
 In The Complete Problem Solver John Arnold provides what he has coined “A 
Total System for Competitive Decision Making.”  He initiates instruction on the methods 
of successful decision making in competitive environments by posing the question, “How 
do we create a future rather than merely cope with the future?”  Analyzing the root causes 
of the situation, options available, and decision risks are said by Arnold to greatly assist 
organizations in having discussions during the decision making process that involve 
argumentation and differences of opinion but simultaneously emphasize maintaining a 
focused set of priorities (Arnold 1992).   
 The best decisions Arnold claims are those which more logically achieve the 
satisfaction of the organization’s criteria, include values and feelings, and reduce risks to 
an acceptable level.  Beginning with Root Cause Analysis one of the most important 
words in the problem solver’s lexicon is, “Why?”  Understanding why things happen 
allows the decision maker to move on to Steps 2 and 3: choosing your options and 
assessing the risks, though “Time” is the primary enemy in competitive and/or crisis 
environments and decisions must be made rather quickly.  There are seven steps outlined 
within this first step of analyzing root causes (Arnold 1992).   
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   Steps in Root Cause Analysis 
1. Prioritize Initiatives 
2. Define Problem or Opportunity, asking what is not happening that should be 
happening, vice versa (general, observable, factual data)  
3.   Describe the Problem with a Three-Pronged Approach  
-Give the situation an identity, asking who is involved, what products or services are 
affected, which organizational departments are engaged 
-Location, asking where is the crises 
-Timing (identifying short and long term effects)  
       4.   Distinguish What is from What is Not 
       5.   Diagnose Obvious Factors Contributing to the Problem 
       6.   Destroy the Hypothesis, asking questions that might possibly undermine the 
              hypothesis 
       7.   Decide What to Do Next (determining the appropriate corrective or    
             opportunistic action) 
 Over time data gets lost or distorted, original issues get lost as the problem 
transforms, feelings, emotions and opinions begin to infuse the crisis (Rashomon Effect).7  
Many of these steps are taken by individuals and thus their organizations on a routine 
basis throughout the day and thus are taken for granted. Breezing straight through root 
cause analysis, typically skimming over the sixth step of destroying the hypothesis and 
identifying other factors responsible for the problem’s existence leads many 
organizations to jump right into the solution.  It takes increased time to be practical and 
follow a systematic method for solving problems and making decision then following 
                                                          
7 A by-word for any situation wherein the truth of an event becomes difficult to verify due to the conflicting 
accounts of different witnesses. 
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hunches and surface observations to arrive at a fast “result,” however rushing through 
analyzing the condition’s root causes may lead to perpetual oversights in the decision’s 
implementation phase, with the result, being the proposed decision not accomplishing its 
objective to extinguish or ameliorate the present condition (Arnold 1992).    
Steps in Option Analysis 
1. Smoke out Issues, asking if decision is necessary 
2. State Your Purpose, identifying solution net ingredients will make you more 
likely to find a solution tailored to your needs 
3. Set Criteria, identifying what you wish to achieve, preserve, and avoid 
4. Set Priorities 
5. Identify Options 
6. Test Options Against Criteria 
7. Troubleshoot and Refine Your Choice 
Steps in Risk Analysis 
1. Scan and Specify Potential Risks 
2. Prioritize Risks 
3. List Likely Causes of Failure 
4. List Preventive Actions 
 Arnold points out that at the heart of Risk Analysis, performed during Option 
Analysis is the simple, yet overlooked necessity to smoke out the issues and inquire as to 
whether the decision being proposed is necessary.  Tunnel vision is needed during the 
process of analyzing options to narrow perceptions and limit risks of searching for new 
and “newer” solutions, in effect wasting time and possibly losing influence.  Identified 
options/problem solutions are tested in Step 6 to ensure that proposed decisions do indeed 
achieve, preserve, and/or avoid the overall purpose for the decision being stated in Step 2.  
Troubleshooting and refining the organization’s winning decision allows for the solution 
to be further improved after the decision’s election, and recognizes that having 
organizations spot early on what can go wrong with the decision’s communication 
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internally and externally through the organization and its effect on later implementation 
of the decision must be kept in mind (Arnold 1992).     
 As mentioned before, smoking out the issues is highly important, yet treated 
naïvely in the crisis decision making process.  The more specifically you can identify 
high-likelihood causes, the greater the chance your experience, know-how, and judgment 
can help you make good decisions that will bring forth opportunities and results desired.  
While smoking out the issues ask questions:  Has something happened that should not 
have, and therefore needs to be corrected or prevented in the future?  Has something 
happened better than expected?  Has something not happened that you wish to happen?  
Is something missing that needs to be provided?     
 In formal fashion, analyzing risks entails articulating what, where, and when. 
Consciously spelling out what can go wrong, where it can go wrong, and when it can go 
wrong alleviates threats of deciding upon an unfruitful decision built upon a poor 
foundation that did not fully account for factors that could have destroyed the initial root 
analysis hypotheses (Arnold 1992).  Clearly identifying root causes first, systematically 
analyzing available options secondly, and lastly moving toward making a decision with 
the least risk presents a solution that is complete in its efforts to be effective in improving 
conditions.      
 MOED’s mission and departmental goals post-Katrina remained the same, “To 
Connect People and Businesses to Opportunities.”  The departmental goals were 1) A 
thriving and diverse New Orleans economy and 2) A well trained, diverse and highly-
paid New Orleans workforce.  Objectives targeted under these two goals fit the needs of 
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the times for New Orleans’ post-Karina economic climate.  The diversion from the path 
of finding the best way to achieve the first three bullets under Goal 1 (See Figure 2.0) 
occurs in the decisions made for implementation.   
The first three bullets were most pertinent to business recovery in the first four 
months following Katrina up to January 1st and still are.  These objectives initiate the plan 
to bring back New Orleans businesses, provide access to contracting opportunities, and 
provide access to financial assistance to retain New Orleans businesses.  Had MOED 
used a systematic approach to decision-making such as the process outlined by Arnold 
the first step in forming a decision would have been analyzing the root causes for 
businesses returning slowly or not at all and choosing to remain in neighboring parishes 
and states.  One of the primary root causes found would have been a lack of access to 
capital.  Neither the Renewal Community or GO Zone provide access to capital.  These 
initiatives assist businesses only when they are operational.  MOED may have decided to 
aggressively target the disbursement of increased Small Business Administration loans 
(SBA).  Secondly, if following a systematic problem-solving method MOED would have 
looked at all of its options, recognized the federal government’s agenda to issue the GO 
Zone and became an active voice, possibly influencing decision-makers to concentrate 
provisions in most-needy communities.          
Method 2 Prudential Practical Reasoning-Pluralist Exchange Model 
 Two ideologies on opposite ends of the decision-making spectrum have been well 
researched through the contemporary study of public policy-making: elitist planning and 
pluralist exchange.  Advocates of elitist planning view collective decisions as deliberate 
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choices from available options made by decision makers on behalf of another group.  
Advocates of the pluralist exchange model regard collective decisions as epiphenomenal 
outcomes as the result of reactive problem-solving, strategic planning and incremental 
decisions made by individuals or groups interacting with one another.  Found in both 
paradigms is a standard criteria for evaluating policy options and making decisions based 
on explicit knowledge and adoption of a set of valued objectives.  Evaluation of the 
outcome tests the extent to which policies effectively and efficiently achieve the set 
objectives by either 1) minimizing the costs of attaining objectives, or 2) maximizing the 
realization of values with given resources.  Failure to meet prescribed criteria provides 
reason for rejecting the decision.  The process of setting criteria and rating its level of 
effectiveness and efficiency is an instrumental concept of policy rationality and is the 
dominant public policy model generally accepted (Manzer 1984). 
 When the legitimacy of a policy is judged against fundamental beliefs and 
political principles on the community, and the responsiveness of a policy satisfying a 
particular individual or the community as a whole, then substantive rationality is 
appropriate to apply in evaluating a policy decision.  Under the criteria of substantive 
rationality a good reason for adopting a policy option would be that the policy is 
considered “just” or “in the public interest.”  If the policy does not meet these criteria 
there would be grounds for rejecting the policy/decision (Manzer 1984).   
 Contemporary decision-making should be confronted with a concept of policy 
rationality that takes both instrumental and substantive rationality into account and 
weighs them equally.  David Gauthier’s analysis of practical reasoning has been 
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influential in the development of the concept of substantive rationality.   In simple terms, 
Gauthier defines a practical problem as a problem about what to do.  It is a problem that 
arises in a particular set of circumstances which can not be overlooked in resolving the 
issue.  It confronts a person or a group whom constrain the potentials for action with their 
attitudes and level of capacity.  There is no formula provided for the theory of practical 
reasoning (Gauthier 1963).  Gauthier argues that words such as “ought,” “should” and 
“best” guide the vocabulary and discourse of practical judgments.  Practical judgments 
guide action and outline what is best to do or what should be done, and are made through 
deliberating the options provided and reasons for taking action.8 
 The reasons to justify a practical judgment involve both prudential and moral 
considerations and are more like hypothetical imperatives than those decisions which are 
categorical.  Prudential reasoning highlights the desires, needs and aims of the agent.  
Three basic statements comprise the prudential practical reasoning process.  Statements 
that:  
1. Specify and rank the decision-maker’s preferences 
2. Specify the context of decision-making (available options and potential benefits 
and costs) 
3. Specify actions to be taken 
 In no way does Gauthier attempt to make the method of practical reasoning a 
“sure-catch-all-way” to solving all crises, but regards the process as a way in which to 
arrive at the best decision recognizing that although attempting to reason “practically,” 
                                                          
8 Gauthier notes that practical judgments are action-guiding not action-determining.  He hypothesizes that 
very often we act on present desires or inclinations against what we know to be the reasonable course of 
action.   
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the decision-maker(s) is still operating within the realm of the uncertain.  “One must look 
before one leaps, but one must still leap”.9      
 Basic statements comprising prudential practical reasoning are similar to Edith 
Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser’s framework for analyzing elitist-planning.  In their 
textbook, A Primer for Policy Analysis, the following steps towards successful decision-
making are provided: 
1. Establish the context of the public problem and objectives for perusal 
2. Lay out alternative courses of action and possibilities for gathering further 
information 
3. Predict consequences of alternative actions, rating the outcomes 
4. Take the best course of action 
 Scholars differentiate the two dominant paradigms of public decision-making as 
pluralist-exchange models (reactive problem solving) predominately assuming prudential 
reasoning (restricted to desires of agent), and elitist-planning models (anticipatory 
planning) predominately assuming moral reasoning on the part of the decision makers.  
Prudential reasoning in an elitist-planning model must bring the criterion of political 
rationality into balance with economic and technical criteria.  Decision makers must ask 
vital political questions that influence a self-regarding mode of rationality.  What will be 
the impact of the decision maker’s policy is people are not persuaded to accept it?  What 
will be the impact of the decision maker’s policy if the price of gaining acceptance is 
very high and resources are scarce?  By necessity, decision makers may have to work 
incrementally, continually assessing political costs against societal benefits and making 
further adjustments (Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978).      
                                                          
9 Gauthier argues that only a practical judgment produced after limited deliberation is useful because the 
time to deliberate is limited.  Limited practical judgments still serves to explain or justify action. 
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 In Lindblom’s “market society” a skeptical view of human intellect is given.  
Debate and bargaining processes are employed as interactive processes to take the place 
of intellectual analysis.  In a negative light, the market society is seen as one in which 
decision makers do not think out their problems; they act them out.  Decisions are highly 
decentralized and disconnected causing large societal problems which are ameliorated 
through by-products or epiphenomena of many individual or group decisions.  The 
market society takes an incremental approach to problem solving and fosters a trial and 
error approach (Lindblom 1977).   
 This pluralist exchange process is also described as reactive problem-solving.  
With the general motives of officials mixed, including power, income, prestige, 
convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in proficient performance of work, desire 
to serve the public interest and commitment to a specific course of action, leaders in 
general are depicted as making decisions grounded in self-interest.  In pluralist exchange 
models of public decision-making, prudential reasoning is a desirable norm.  As noted by 
Aaron Wildavsky, it is difficult enough for a decision maker to calculate how the 
interests he/she is advocating might best be served, but even more difficult to perform 
the same calculation for others who may be affected (Wildavsky 1964).    
 It can be argued that MOED actively sought to expand the pre-existing Renewal 
Community of seven tracts to twenty tracts immediately realizing that it was an initiative 
which could easily be reached, possibly helping the city “save face” in a suffering 
business environment which it appeared to have little assistance to give.  The 
department, the city, the state, and FEMA were all learning what roles they should play, 
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who had the resources, and how to easily have access to them.  When Mayor Nagin and 
Governor Blanco announced the expansion of the Renewal Community in November 
2005 it may have given hope to businesses that help was truly on the way, however once 
realizing what the Renewal Community really provided (tax incentives) and realizing the 
few businesses which actually qualified based on locale, business men and women grew 
increasingly disgruntled and disappointed.  They either weren’t in the twenty eligible 
census tracts, but were one of the other one hundred sixty-seven or had lost everything 
and had been told they were denied a SBA loan.   
This decision was pluralist-exchange based being that is was highly reactive and 
practical.  However, whether the decision to amend the RC boundaries to twenty census 
tracts was moral and acting in the public interest is arguable.  Was the expansion in 
company’s interest or simply a pacifier?  Both.           
Method 3 Antecedents of Groupthink Model 
 The theory of groupthink is considered to be one of the most cited contributions to 
the study of decision making.  Since the introduction of the theory in the early 70s the 
core of the hypothesis for the groupthink model is that the existence of certain antecedent 
conditions within groups of decision makers results in defective decision-making 
processes, which in turn are highly likely to produce poor policy outcomes.  The scholar 
behind the theory, I.L. Janis hypothesized that information-processing errors, also 
referred to as symptoms of defective decision making, are first preceded by several 
different variables and are an important casual source of defective decision making.  
Quite a major matter, it is during the stage prior to having to process information 
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regarding crises that an organization establishes group norms, allows for a leadership 
style to emerge and set precedents, and situational constraints materialize (1996).   
 Antecedent factors contributing to how an organization processes information 
include such factors as: group structure, leadership style, and situational variables.  These 
antecedent conditions set the stage for effective or defective decision making.  Therefore, 
it is at this early stage that decision-making groups can adopt procedures intended to 
avoid defective decision making (Schafer and Crichlow 1996).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Derived from Janis in 1982 ten negative antecedents of groupthink are directly 
linked to seven information processing errors resulting in a low probability of favorable 
outcome.  From a theoretical review Mark Shafer and Scott Crichlow refined a set of 
operational definitions for the ten antecedent conditions.   
1. Group insulation:  Decision makers do not coordinate and communicate with 
others outside the immediate decision-making circle.  They isolate themselves 
Information Processing Errors 
1. Gross Omissions in Surveying Alternatives 
2. Gross Omissions in Surveying Objectives 
3. Failure to Examine Majors Costs & Risks of 
Preferred Choice 
4. Poor Information Search 
5. Selective Bias in Processing 
6. Failure to Reconsider Originally Rejected 
Alternatives 
7. Failure to Work Out Detailed Implementation, 
Monitoring & Contingency Plans 
 
Antecedents of Groupthink 
1. Group Insulation 
2. Lack of Tradition of 
Impartial Leadership 
3. Lack of Tradition of 
Methodical Procedures 
4. Group Homogeneity 
5. Short Time Constraint 
6. Recent Failure 
7. High Personal Stress 
8. Overestimation of the 
Group 
9. Closed Mindedness 
10. Pressures Toward 
Uniformity 
Low 
Probability 
of 
Favorable 
Outcome 
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from other bureaucrats, intelligence officers, diplomats, allies, and those on 
location at the scene of the crisis, relying almost exclusively on members of its 
own group for information and counsel. 
2. Lack of tradition of impartial leadership: The leader limits open discussion of a 
wide range of alternatives, and has a history of making their positions clear or 
giving the impression that he/she has predispositions. 
3. Lack of tradition of methodical procedures: The leader has not made a routine of 
having information search teams, routine and systematic decision-making 
meetings, and analysis of pros and cons. 
4. Group Homogeneity:  A lack of disparity exists in the social background and 
ideology of the members of the decision-making group. 
5. Perceived short time constraint: The group suffers under perceived temporal 
limits that affect its ability to consider policy options fully. 
6. Low self-esteem caused by recent failure: Recent defeat weighs on the minds of 
decision-making group and affects current decisions. 
7. High personal stress: Crises causes great anxiety because of both the stakes 
involved and the perceived chances of success or unpleasant policy options. 
8. Overestimation of the group: Group operates in air of invulnerability  
9. Closed-mindedness: Group relies on stereotypes or guiding metaphors or 
analogies. 
10. Pressures toward uniformity: One or more of the following exist: self-
censorship, an illusion of unanimity, direct pressure on dissenters, self-appointed 
mind guards. 
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 Janis notes that this condition is not situational bound but rather a general pattern 
of behavior (1996).  Connections between antecedent conditions and faulty decision 
making in some cases appears anecdotal.  In others, systematic statistical analysis 
investigates 1) whether each individual antecedent condition is correlated with Herek’s 
index of information-processing errors, 2) the cumulative effect of antecedent conditions 
on the number of information-processing errors, 3) the direct effect of the antecedent’s 
index on crises outcomes.   
 Faulty structural environments are seen as the primary factor in producing 
unfavorable outcomes and are the effect of antecedent conditions on crisis outcomes.  It 
was hypothesized that a higher number of antecedent conditions results in a higher 
number of information-processing errors by the decision-making group.  Four of the ten 
antecedent conditions were found to be related to information-processing errors in a 
statistically significant manner through an individual bivariate analysis.  These influential 
antecedents are: lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of tradition of methodical 
procedures, overestimation of the group, and closed mindedness.  A fifth variable, 
pressures toward uniformity, is close to being significant.  The other six antecedents, 
although identified as present in the study of select case studies, were not found to be 
statistically significant (Schafer and Crichlow 1996).   
 The set of antecedent conditions clearly found to be correlated with information-
processing errors in group decision making deal with leadership style (lack of tradition of 
impartial leadership), group procedures (lack of tradition of methodical procedures), and 
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patterns of group behavior (overestimation of the group, closed mindedness and pressures 
toward uniformity) (Schafer and Crichlow 1996) . 
 An important policy-making implication of Shafer and Criflow’s hypothesis is 
that if what matters in terms of the quality of the decision are the structural preconditions, 
then focusing on the information-processing errors alone is misguided.  By the time an 
organization/decision-making group gets to the information-processing stage it is too late.  
What matters to begin with is how the leader and decision-making group structurally 
organize and regularly conduct themselves.  Research findings do not necessarily suggest 
that information-processing errors are unimportant.  Instead, the processing errors are 
classified as treatable symptoms of a problem that has earlier origins, namely in the 
structural and behavioral environment of decision making.   
As delineated in the dysfunctional organizational design of MOED, the proper 
remedy presents itself as leaders and decision-making groups re-structure their 
environment.  Twenty-one employees with diverse work functions can not be grouped 
into one category, “Team,” under one head, the director, and be expected to not incur 
problems had through miscommunication.  See Figure 2.0.  Re-structuring the work 
environment to one which develops patterns of impartial leadership and methodical 
procedures and avoids overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures 
toward uniformity leads to better decisions and hence, successful outcomes.  With these 
characteristics of effective decision- making at play, fewer processing errors should 
emerge, and outcomes may be more favorable.  
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Decision-Making Model Analysis 
 When analyzing the three decision-making models in this text there are several 
points found in each model present in MOED’s two primary decisions.  This is the basis 
for why the three models, complete problem solver, prudential practical reasoning, and  
groupthink were selected for review and analysis of MOED’s organizational structure 
and decision-making processes.  Questions are raised surrounding local, state and federal 
legislatures basis for deciding which parishes are entitled to provisions made in the GO 
Zone, however the focus of this analysis is on an organizational unit operating on the 
local level to achieve self-defined goals.   
Model 1 Critique 
 Delineation of the three models shows that the Complete Problem Solver Model 
provides the most detailed and outlined process for arriving at effective and efficient 
decisions of the three models.  It is a simple process laid out in plain language that can 
assist organizations in acquiring desired outcomes.  However, there appears to be 
overlaps found amongst the three forms of analysis: root cause, options, and risks.  The 
seven steps defined in chronological order in root cause analysis may not be the best 
route provided for attempting to define a plan of execution and implementation.  The 
steps would prove to be more useful if arranged in the following manner.   
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Arnold’s Root Cause Analysis 
Procedure  
Suggested Root Cause Procedure 
1. Prioritize Initiatives 
 
1. Describe Problem with 3-Pronged 
Approach 
2. Define Problem or Opportunity 
 
2. Diagnose Obvious Factors 
Contributing to Problem 
3. Describe the Problem with 3-
Pronged   
3. Define Problem or Opportunity 
4. Distinguish What is From What is 
Not  
4. Distinguish What is From What Is  
5. Diagnose Obvious Factors 
Contributing  to Problem                        
5. Destroy the Hypothesis 
6. Destroy the Hypothesis  6. Prioritize Initiatives 
7. Decide What to Do Next   7. Decide What to Do Next 
 Prioritizing initiatives is explained by Arnold as the process by which 
organizations sequentially articulate what it is they would like to implement in order to 
achieve a set goal.  This step in the decision-making process should not be conducted 
first.  Giving the situation an identity by acknowledging who is involved and what is 
affected, taking the situation’s location into account, and identifying the short and long 
term effects of the crises should be done first.  Step 4, Distinguishing What is From What 
is Not, should remain in the same order, however, the remaining five steps should be 
arranged as portrayed in the above chart.  Identifying what is obviously causing the 
problem second, compiling factual data for further insight into the crises, articulating a 
general hypothesis and then attempting to undermine the hypothesis through high-level 
questions, brainstorming potential initiatives to eradicate the crises, and then deciding on 
what path to take after prioritizing those initiatives will lead to be a clearer, more 
effective, and successful decision.  Step 4, Distinguishing what the problem is from what 
it is not is probably not needed, and an internal processing step taken when taking the 
first step of describing the problem with a three-pronged approach.   
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Arnold’s method gives the presumption that if followed in the order provided 
organizations and decisions makers will indeed ultimately arrive at successful decisions.  
His steps do not have to be followed “to a T” to arrive at a decision that actually caters to 
outcomes desired.  The steps found in option and risk analysis are necessary, but one 
might find that they may have previously completed a step listed in these two areas of 
analysis in the first analysis of root cause analysis.   
Model 2 Critique   
 Advocates of the pluralist-exchange model acknowledge that decisions are often a 
result of reactive problem-solving, strategic planning and incremental decisions.  A 
detailed model is not provided for guiding a decision-maker through a process to arrive at 
a successful decision as that found in the Complete Problem Solver, however a standard 
criteria for evaluating policy options and making decisions is present.  The specifics of 
how to evaluate a policy/decision is simplified and judged based on the decision’s ability 
to achieve the set goal.  Manzer’s ideology that a decision is viewed as successful if it is 
seen as effective and efficient is very business-like in manner.  An efficient decision is 
defined as one which minimizes the costs of attaining objectives.  An effective decision is 
defined as one which maximizes the realization of values or priorities with given 
resources.  This type of evaluation of a decision may not truly capture the full degree to 
which an actual process is needed systematically ensure that all factors influencing the 
situation, all options with their identified risk levels are considered.  So, although the 
evaluation of good decision is stated rather plainly, the process by which to best arrive at 
the efficient and effective decision is not provided.   
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 Evaluating a decision through the realm of substantive rationality is also useful, 
but just as all decisions can not be viewed as successful solely based on their level of 
effectiveness and efficiency, neither can a decision viewed solely as “just” and in the 
“public interest” be considered successful.  Other attributes of a good decision must be 
present.  As Gauthier points out, the reasons to justify a practical decision should 
encumber both prudential and moral considerations.  This is to say that the desires of the 
decision maker as well as the proposed decision should work together to implement what 
is in the public interest.   
 Of particular appreciation is Gauthier’s acknowledgment that decisions are made 
within the realm of the uncertain.  There are often multiple decisions on the table to 
choose from.  The goal is to choose the best decision comprised of suggestions detailing 
what should and ought to be initiated.  Acting out the best decision in an incremental 
fashion is realistically the only way to determine the success of a decision, and allows for 
alterations to be made along the way throughout implementation.  This method however 
is seen by Lindblom in his “market society” as something not to be modeled.  Yet, in all 
decisions that are made it should be acknowledged that it is only through trial and error 
that the decision can truly proven to be effective and efficient.  This step of the process 
could be added to Arnold’s Complete Problem Solver Model which ends with simply 
deciding what to do next.  A “complete” process would include acknowledging that after 
the best decision has been made and implemented, alterations may still be needed. 
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Model 3 Critique     
  In the former two models focused is given to the process by which an 
organization should arrive at the best decision for execution taking into account both 
prudential and moral reasoning.  The third model, antecedents of groupthink, was elected 
because of its emphasis placed on negative factors which effect organizational structure, 
information processes resulting in defective decision making.   
 Crises management hypotheses like most hypotheses in general have value 
judgments attached to them.  One premise pertinent to the study of crises is that crises are 
largely bad and those which are mismanaged worse.  Evaluating decisions chosen by the 
Mayor’s Office of Economic Development without utilizing a model founded in 
analyzing factors contributing to decisions which are defective would be overlooking a 
useful method of assessment.   
 Janis’ hypothesis that information-processing errors are preceded by several 
variables which are important casual sources of making poor decisions adds further 
understanding and steps toward arriving at the best decision.  All of his ten antecedents of 
the groupthink model were not empirically proven to be statistically significant, but each 
was found present in several case studies analyzed by Janis, and should remain included 
in the list of antecedents to be aware of.  It is averred through his study that far previous 
to an organization sitting down to decide the best plan of action, a leadership style has 
emerged, group norms have been established, and organizational constraints have been 
identified and accepted.          
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 Definitions provided by Shafer and Crichlow are useful and only the first 
antecedent seems to not take the full implication of its title into account.  “Group 
insulation” which is the first antecedent listed notes that having a group of decision 
makers isolate themselves from others in government or in some involved with the 
situation at hand contributes to arriving at poor decisions.  What should have also been 
included in this definition is the negative impact presented when collective decision-
makers only focus on their own agenda, only half recognizing the agenda of others or not 
at all.  It is possible that this trait is included by the scholars under Closed Mindedness.   
 Faulty structural environments are seen as the primary factor in producing 
unfavorable outcomes and are the effect of negative antecedent conditions on crisis 
management.  The structural environment is molded by the organization’s leaders and 
thus emphasis is rightfully placed on how the leader develops and facilitates decision-
making groups and their discourse and process for analyzing the crisis.  Overall, this 
model hits the target in assessing factors contributing to defective decisions and should 
always be considered by local governmental leaders when directing organizations 
through times of normalcy, doing so automatically feeds into the establishment of 
departmental norms and will more likely be adhered to during times of crises.    
 As said previously, it can be inferred that norms set pre-crisis are carried through 
during times of crisis.  Departmental norms had in MOED are not an exception to the 
rule.  If there is a lack of leadership impartiality or a lack of methodical procedures for 
arriving at decisions for implementation, it is very difficult to establish new antecedents 
as norms during a time of crisis with less resources and time.    
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Lessons for MOED in Crisis Decision-Making 
 Eight months following Hurricane Katrina business recovery in New Orleans is 
still dismal, yet steady.  The unemployment rate of workers still displaced by Katrina 
jumped to nearly 35% in May, a 54% increase since April.  Louisiana’s labor force has 
shrunk every month since November, and is now 12% smaller than it was in July 2005, a 
month before the landfall of Katrina.  Nearly one in three of the working age adults still 
displaced by Katrina are still out of a job.  The proportion of utility customers using 
services again in New Orleans has increased from about 50% in March to 60% in April.  
Only one in five public schools are open, however the re-opening of two elementary 
schools and one high school is indicative that families are returning to the city.  Marking 
the steady return of the tourism and hospitality industry, hotels and bed and breakfasts 
continue to re-open in the metro area.  64% of bed and breakfasts have re-opened, and 
60% of the hotels (Liu, Fellowes, and Mabanta May 2006).  Of the 8,560 businesses in 
New Orleans pre-Katrina, approximately 1,800 of them have been able to re-open 
(Census Bureau 2003).   
 Of the various ideologies for studying the purpose and management of crises there 
are two pertinent concentrations of study which correlate well with those decisions 
chosen by the Mayor’s Office of Economic Development.  These studies concentrate on 
1) The purpose or organizational context in which decisions are reached during periods of 
intense crises and 2) How decisions are made in a crises (Brecher 1977; Allison 1971).  
There are three decisions which are questionable for possibly not having achieved desired 
outcomes.  These questions are:  MOED’s decision to 1) Pursue amending legislation to 
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expand Renewal Community boundaries to include the entire City of New Orleans.  2) 
To consciously or unconsciously overlook early intermediary legislative discussion and 
processes for the inauguration of GO Zone legislation.  What is also questioned in this 
text, but is only of tertiary focus is the reasoning behind state legislatures working with 
the U.S. Congress to include all thirty-one parishes classified as “core disaster areas” in 
the Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone).   
 Devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina has won this storm the number one spot 
for being the worst natural disaster ever recorded in this nation.  Although, many would 
say that that the devastation caused by this storm was not natural at all, but of man-made 
nonfeasance, it should be expected that any governmental entity tackling new and 
uncharted dilemmas will stumble, miss opportunities, choose half-baked decisions, and 
thus perform sub-optimally.  Katrina has shown the world how little prepared the United 
States is in dealing with domestic threats and catastrophes, whether looking at the slow 
reaction time of FEMA, the inflexibility and high standards of SBA low-interest loans, or 
over-issuing of financial assistance from Red Cross.10  MOED has not proven itself to be 
any different from state and federal governmental entities to perform outside the realm of 
mismanagement and mere mistakes.   
      The Mayor’s Office of Economic Development was faced with two challenges.  
The challenge of working with a staff that was cut in half, from fifty-four employees, 
down to twenty-two on a reduced budget.  The job of each employee of course was 
                                                          
10 See Hope Yen (2006, March). FEMA Mismanaged Katrina Recovery Effort, GAO Says.  Washington 
Post.  Retrieved May 29, 2006, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/16/AR2006031602154.html Also see (2006), March). Statement:  American 
Red Cross Currently Investigating Allegations.  Retrieved May 29, 2006 from 
http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease 
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multiplied, yet the resources were depleting.  Under normal circumstances an 
organization faced with the challenge of downsizing and re-stabilizing its organization is 
given a minimum of six months to organize, set new precedents, and again focus on 
achieving set outcomes.  MOED was given a month, resulting in those necessary 
interrelated strategies such as helping the organization to focus on a new clearly 
illustrated future, encouraging new thinking, and flattening organizational structures by 
consolidating administrative positions while widening the span of control (Benest 2005).  
These necessary strategies to reshape processes, precedents, and protocol in MOED were 
possibly omitted, and carried forward negative antecedents which resulted in defective 
decision-making.   
 The antecedents of the groupthink model as described by Janis were highly 
influential in setting MOED on the path of pursuing the expansion of the Renewal 
Community throughout the City of New Orleans.  Those antecedents most evident in the 
organization’s structure are group insulation, lack of tradition of impartial leadership, 
lack of tradition of methodical procedures, perceived short time constraint, high-personal 
stress, and closed-mindedness.  Lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of tradition 
of methodical procedures, and consolidation of administrative positions while widening 
the span of control (noted earlier) are illustrated in MOED’s “Staff Presentation.”  See 
Figure 2.0.  Notice the hierarchy of organizational structure.  It does not clearly define 
protocol, a process for decision-making, and hints at the possibility of many bottle-necks 
in not only decision-making, but implementation. 
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 The other antecedents of MOED’s information processing errors are found in 
MOED’s decision to pursue expansion of the RC without making itself privy to those 
conversations regarding business recovery at the state and federal level.  In the pursuit of 
achieving its own agenda MOED isolated itself and did not become involved with the 
federal and state agenda to include thirty-one parishes in the GO Zone until the 
communication and process of passing the legislation was complete.  By then it was too 
late.   
 It is from these findings that MOED is encouraged to 1. Review its antecedents of 
group think and work towards improving its organizational and communication processes 
internally.  2. Using Arnold’s Complete Problem Solver Model or a decision-making 
model very similar begin to consistently implement a step-by-step process for arriving at 
what Gauthier considers to be the “best” decision/plan of action, and 3.  Keep in mind 
that while working towards providing effective and efficient public policy, prudential 
practical reasoning should be deliberate, yet not neglect moral reasoning.  Decisions must 
be made timely with the public’s interest in incremental fashion to allow for flexibility if 
needed. 
 Had MOED asked pointed questions noted in the Complete Problem Solver 
Model the organization may have never pursued expanding the Renewal Community 
until after communicating with the state and federal government and having input in the 
writing of the GO Zone legislation.  Priorities post-Katrina would have changed.  Months 
before Katrina MOED was in discussion with HUD to expand the RC to include thirteen 
additional census tracts.  This was a Pre-Katrina agenda that MOED followed up on 
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immediately following the hurricane and re-locating its operations back into New 
Orleans, but based on MOED’s outcomes should not have been the first initiative to 
address.   
Had MOED taken time to re-organize, assess departmental goals, and truly 
identify root causes, options and risks, deciding to have legislation regarding the Renewal 
Community amended may have become a second priority, not a first.  MOED may have 
prioritized objectives to accomplish such by first working with HUD to request the 
expansion of the RC based on HUD’s current guidelines, widening the boundaries to 
include twenty census tracts, and then working with the state legislature to amend the RC 
legislation congressionally to allow for “the most recent census data” to be used for 
eligibility in acquiring increased census tracts throughout the city.   
             Hypotheses concerning crisis management, unlike conventional scientific 
statements are imperatives seen as “recipes for action.”  The objective of crisis 
management that stands out pertaining to the inauguration of the GO Zone is the zero-
sum situation in game theory - gain for one side is by definition a lost for the other.  With 
every “extra” parish unnecessarily included in the GO Zone’s boundaries, a loss can be 
attributed to that “extra” parish’s inclusion in the legislation for lessening the appeal of 
investment in more affected areas.  A hypothesis regarding the GO Zone would be that 
the GO Zone is merely maintaining the status quo.  Those businesses which can do – do.   
Those businesses save.  Those which can not do – don’t.  “If you can make it on your 
own, then we, the federal government, will give you a kick back, a reward for your hard 
work.”  Since this is the case, and this is pretty much what incentives ultimately do, then 
 64
MOED should have taken an active role in the politics behind this legislation’s 
inauguration as a primary actor. 
Conclusion 
In the end the City of New Orleans is possibly not attracting the level of 
investment that it could had it not had to compete with so many parishes within the state.  
Furthermore, the expansion of the RC to include the entire city has not yet been passed.  
These two conditions only aggravate the notion that MOED has accomplished little in 
assisting the business recovery effort.  What businesses are craving are loans, not tax 
incentives.  While MOED canvassed the city and held workshops regarding tax 
incentives, businesses lacked what they truly need assistance with: quick financing and 
easy access to low-interest loans and seed capital.   
Several antecedents influenced the department’s organizational structure thus 
increasing information processing errors, resulting in unfavorable outcomes.  Questions 
posed during option analysis articulated in the Complete Problem Solver may have 
avoided this waste of time and energy.  Have we “smoked out the issues?”  “What is our 
problem?”  Businesses are in need of financing.  “Is expanding the RC going to remedy 
this dilemma?”  The answer would have been “No.”  Give the problem an identity – 
“Who is involved?”  The state and federal government.  “What are they trying to 
accomplish?”  They are more than likely going to quickly pass the GO Zone.  “What are 
the details of this legislation?”- gathering increased data.  “This does not help New 
Orleans.  It increases interstate competition when we are already disadvantaged.  What 
are our options?  What are our risks?  Here is our plan of action.”   
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MOED worked incrementally towards arriving at a decision using prudential 
practical reasoning, placing its desires at the forefront.  The drawback to this was the 
desired outcome being hard to come by because the real dilemma of businesses not 
having working capital was overshadowed by initiatives had by MOED pre-Katrina.  
Working in isolation, lacking a tradition of impartial leadership and methodical 
procedures, having a perceived short time constraint, high-personal stress amongst 
decision-makers, and closed-mindedness worked against MOED being able to not only 
achieve its agenda of expanding RC boundaries to include the entire city, but also led 
MOED to being a non-participant in a decision-making process that they could have been 
successful in, the inauguration of the GO Zone.  Neither initiative is proving to be 
“renewing the community.”  Whether the GO Zone is filled with “pork” and given to 
parishes not in need of the provisions given should be studied further.  A suggestion 
would be to extend the GO Zone deadline for parishes found to have incurred 
catastrophic damage for an additional three years, ending in 2011.  As for now the post-
Katrina status-quo for New Orleans has been maintained and predictions of whether 
President Bush’s promise that “our job and our goal for the Gulf Coast was not to 
survive, but to thrive, and just to cope, but to overcome” is sketchy.            
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